Stochastic Stability in Schelling's Segregation Model with Markovian
  Asynchronous Update by Istrate, Gabriel
ar
X
iv
:1
80
7.
05
41
9v
1 
 [c
s.G
T]
  1
4 J
ul 
20
18
Stochastic Stability in Schelling’s
Segregation Model with Markovian
Asynchronous Update
Gabriel Istrate∗
July 17, 2018
Abstract
We investigate the dependence of steady-state properties of Schelling’s
segregation model on the agents’ activation order. Our basic formal-
ism is the Pollicott-Weiss version of Schelling’s segregation model.
Our main result modifies this baseline scenario by incorporating con-
tagion in the decision to move: (pairs of) agents are connected by a
second, agent influence network. Pair activation is specified by a ran-
dom walk on this network.
The considered schedulers choose the next pair nonadaptively. We
can complement this result by an example of adaptive scheduler (even
one that is quite fair) that is able to preclude maximal segregation.
Thus scheduler nonadaptiveness seems to be required for the validity
of the original result under arbitrary asynchronous scheduling. The
analysis (and our result) are part of an adversarial scheduling approach
we are advocating to evolutionary games and social simulations.
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1 Introduction
Schelling’s Segregation Model [1] is one of the fundamental dynamical
systems of Agent-Based Computational Economics, perhaps one of the
most convincing examples of Asynchronous Cellular Automata (ACA)
[2] employed in the social sciences. It exhibits large-scale self-organizing
neighborhoods, due to agents’ desire to live close to their own kind. A
remarkable feature of the model that has captured the attention of social
scientists is the fact that segregation is an emergent phenomenon, that may
appear even in the presence of just mild preferences (at the individual
level) towards living with one’s own kind. The model has sparked a sig-
nificant interest and work, coming from various areas such as Statistical
Physics [3], agent-based computational economics [4, 5], game theory [6],
theoretical computer science [7, 8, 9], or applied mathematics [10].
Schelling’s segregation model is an asynchronous dynamical system
on a graph (usually a finite portion of the one-dimensional or the two-
dimensional lattice). It can be described, informally as follows: vertices in
the graph are in one of three states: unoccupied, when no agent sits on the
given node, or one of red/blue (±1), corresponding to the color of the agent
inhabiting the node. Agents have a (non-strict) preference towards living
among agents of the same color. This is modeled by considering a local
neighborhood around the agent. Depending on the density of like-colored
agents in the neighborhood the agent may be in one of two states: happy
and unhappy. An unhappy agent may seek to trade places with another
agent in order to become happy. It was originally observed via ”pen-and-
paper simulations”, and proved rigorously in a variety of settings, that
segregated states may arise even when agent only have a weak preference
for its own color, and are happy to live in a mixed neighborhood, as long
as it contains “enough” of its own kind. Difference in the topology, activa-
tion order, specification of the update mechanism account for the dizzying
variety of variants of the model that have been investigated so far (for the
intellectual context of the model and a related one, due to Sakoda, see
[11]).
Qualitative properties of asynchronous cellular automata are highly
dependent on activation order [12, 13]. In particular, when viewed as dy-
namical systems, ACA may exhibit a multitude of limit cycles , and the
update dynamics ”chooses” one of these limit cycle in a path dependent
manner. The challenge then becomes to explain the selection of one par-
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ticular limit cycle among many possible ones.
One particularly interesting class of techniques, brought to evolution-
ary games by Foster and Young [14] (see also [6]) uses the concept of
stochastic stability to deal with this problem. It was the fundamental in-
sight of Peyton-Young [6] that adding continuous small perturbations to
a certain dynamics might help “steer”— the system towards a particular
subset of equilibria, the so-called stochastically stable states. Indeed, in sev-
eral versions of Schelling’s segregation model [15, 6, 5] the most segregates
states are identified as precisely the stochastically stable equilibria of the
dynamics.
Though such results are interesting, they are still not realistic enough
enough: results about stochastic stability in models on graphs may be sen-
sitive to the precise specification of the update order, which in realistic
scenarios need not be the random one. As noted in many papers, pre-
cise specification of an asynchronous schedule in social systems can arise
frommany factors, including geography or agent incentives [16]. It is thus
important to study validity of baseline results under different schedul-
ing models. A dramatic example of this type is that of the related model
of logit response dynamics, another model analyzed via stochastic stability
[17]. Going in this model from a random single-node update to parallel
modes (the so-called revision process of [18]) may lead (in general games)
to the selection (via stochastic stability) of states that are not even Nash
equilbria. In contrast, for local interaction games the parallel all-logit rule
has a Gibbs limiting distribution [9], similar to the random update case.
Neither random scheduling nor parallel update can accurately model
social contagion phenomena, i.e., agents becoming active as a result of other
agents’ action, via communication or imitation. Thus it is of interest to
study the robustness social models to variations in the update rule. In-
deed, in [19, 20] we have proposed an adversarial approach to social simu-
lations. Roughly speaking, this means that we consider the baseline dy-
namics under random scheduling, then modify the update order to arbi-
trary scheduling, and attempt to derive necessary and/or sufficient con-
ditions on the scheduler that make the results from the random update
case extend to the adversarial setting. We have accomplished this in [20]
for Prisoners’ Dilemma with Pavlov strategy, a Markov chain previously
investigated in [21], and in [19] for the logit response dynamics.
The purpose of this paper is to introduce contagion in evolutionary ver-
sions of Schelling’s segregation model, as studied by Pollicott and Weiss
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[10], and study the setting where the set of agents that becomes active is
specified by a random walk on a second ”communication” network. A
similar model was investigated for the logit response dynamics in [19],
and is apparently consistent with some real-life contagion phenomena in
power networks [22]. In the most general setting this communication
network works on pairs of vertices. The more natural case where agents
influence each other is a special case of our setting. The feature of the
Pollicott-Weiss model that is of special interest to our study is that, al-
though Schelling’s modelmight havemultiple equlibria, it is only themost
segregated states that are stochastically stable. Our result shows that this
extends to a scenario with social contagion: we prove a result with a simi-
lar flavor under a more general nonadaptive model of activation.
Even though we use analytic rather than experimental techniques, our
results are naturally related to a long line of research that investigates the
robustness of discrete models under various scheduling models [23, 13].
On the other hand the notion we consider, that of stochastic stability, is
highly related to the analysis of cellular automata using dynamical sys-
tems techniques [24]. In contrast to many such studies, though, that only
perturb the initial system state, stochastic stability embodies the notion of
stability under continuous (but vanishingly small) perturbations.
2 Preliminaries
We first review the notion of stochastic stability for perturbed dynamical
systems described by Markov chains:
Definition 1. Let the Markov chain P 0 be defined on a finite state set Ω. For
every ǫ > 0, we also define a Markov chain P ǫ on Ω. Family (P ǫ)ǫ≥0 is called a
regular perturbed Markov process if all of the following conditions hold:
• For every ǫ > 0 Markov chain P ǫ is irreducible and aperiodic.
• For each pair of states x, y ∈ Ω, limǫ>0 P
ǫ
xy = P
0
xy.
• Whenever Pxy = 0 there exists a real number r(m) > 0, called the resis-
tance of transitionm = (x→ y), such that as ǫ→ 0, P ǫxy = Θ(ǫ
r(m)).
Let µǫ be the stationary distrib. of P ǫ. State s is stochastically stable if limǫ→0µ
ǫ(s) >
0.
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We use a standard tool in this area: a result due to Young (Lemma 3.2
in [6]) that allows us to recognize stochastically stable states in a Markov
Chain using spanning trees of minimal resistance:
Definition 2. If j ∈ S(G) is a state, a tree rooted at node j is a set T of edges so
that for any state w 6= j there exists an unique (directed) path from w to j. The
resistance of a rooted tree T is defined as the sum of resistances of all edges in T .
Proposition 1. (Young) The stochastically stable states of a regular Markov
process (Pǫ) are precisely those states z ∈ Ω such that there exists a tree T rooted
at z of minimal resistance (among all rooted trees).
3 The model
We consider an N × N two-dimensional lattice graph G with periodic
boundary conditions (that is, a torus). Let V be the set of vertices of this
graph. Each vertex of G hosts an agent, colored either red or blue. The
neighborhood of a vertex v is the four-point neighborhood, consisting of the
cell to the left,up,right,down of the cell holding v. An agent’s utility is
written as ∀i ∈ V , ui(x) = r · w(xi) + ǫi, where r is a positive constant,
assumed similarly to [5] to be the same for all agents, and w(x) is defined,
similarly to [10], as the difference between the number of neighbors of x
having the same color and the number of neighbors of x having the oppo-
site color. Finally, ǫi are (possibly different) agent-specific constants.
Next we specify our scheduling model, defined as follows:
Definition 3. [Markovian contagion]: To each pair of vertices e we associate a
probability distribution De on V × V such that e ∈ supp(De)
1. We then choose
the pair to be scheduled next as follows: Let pi be the pair chosen at stage i. Select
the next scheduled pair pi+1 by sampling from the set of pairs in Dpi . We assume
that for any two pairs e, e′ the following condition holds:
Pr[e→ e′] > 0⇔ Pr[e′ → e] > 0. (1)
In other words: the next scheduled pair only depends on the last sched-
uled pair, succession relation e→ e′ specifies a bidirected graphH(G)whose
1This translates, intuitively, to the following condition: we always give the partici-
pants in a swap the chance to immediately reevaluate their last move.
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vertex set is V × V , and the scheduled pair can be seen as performing a
random walk (possibly a non-uniform one) on H(G). In particular the
next chosen pair is not guaranteed to have different labels on endpoints.
Furthermore, graph H(G) should be connected, otherwise the choice of
a particular initial sequence of moves could preclude a given edge from
ever being scheduled sometimes in the future.
Observation 1. A particular case of Definition 3, which justifies the name con-
tagion is described informally as follows: agents, rather than pairs, are given the
opportunity to switch. They randomly choose a swapping neighbor among those
available to them. There exists a second, separate influence network I . The next
scheduled agent is one of the neighbors (in I) of the previously scheduled agent.
Indeed, to describe this scenario in the setting of the previous definition, defineDe
to consist of pairs e′ that share with e a vertex.
Observation 2. The random scheduler is a particular case of Definition 3, when
De is the uniform distribution on V × V .
To complete the description of the dynamics, we only need to specify
the probability that two agents inhabiting the different endpoints of a pair
e = (u, v) switch when pair e is scheduled. This is accomplished using the
so-called log-linear response rule [25, 6, 18], specified as follows: let S be the
state before the switch and T be the state obtained if the two agents at u, v
switch. Then:
Pr[S → T ] =
eβ·[u1(T )+u2(T )]
eβ[u1(S)+u2(S)] + eβ[u1(T )+u2(T )]
, (2)
where u1, u2 are the corresponding utility functions of the two agents
at the endpoints of the scheduled pair, and β > 0 is a constant. This is,
of course, the noisy version of the best-response move, that would choose
the move that maximizes the sum of utilities u1(·) + u2(·).
The state of the system is defined by a vector w ∈ {−1,+1}V is a vector
encoding the labels of all vertices of the torus. To obtain a description
of the dynamics as an aperiodic Markov chain we have to complete the
description of the system state by a pair r of vertices, i.e., the last pair that
had the opportunity to switch by being scheduled. Thus the state space
of the Markov chain is S(G) := {±1}V × (V × V ). When H(G) is strongly
connected,Mβ is ergodic, so it has an unique stationary distribution Πβ. It
is easy to see (and similar to previous results e.g. in [6]) that the family of
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chains (Mǫ)ǫ>0 is a regularly perturbed Markov process (where we define
ǫ = e−β).
Definition 4. A state w ∈ {±1}V is called maximally segregated ifw realizes the
minimum value of the number of red-blue edges (of the torus), across all possible
states on G with a given number of red/blue agents.
In [10] a complete characterization of a maximally segregated state was
obtained (Theorem 2 in that paper). Roughly they are horizontal or verti-
cal ”bands”, possibly with a ”strip” attached, or a rectangle, possibly with
at most two ”strips” attached. We refer the reader to [10] for details, and
don’t discuss it any further.
4 Main result and its interpretation.
Our main result is:
Theorem 1. The stochastically stable states for Schelling’s segregation model
with Markovian contagion form a subset of the set Q ⊆ S(G),
Q = {(w, e)|w is maximally segregated and e ∈ V × V } (3)
In other words: the conclusion that stochastically stable states in Schelling’s
segregation model are maximally segregated is robust to extending the
update model from a random one to those from the family from Defini-
tion 3, that incorporate Markovian contagion.
The defining feature of the class of schedulers in the previous result
seems to be that they choose the next scheduled pair nonadaptively: the
next pair only depends on the last scheduled pair, and not on other par-
ticulars of the system state. Indeed, in the full version of the paper we
will complement the result above by another one (very easy to state and
prove), that shows that some adaptive scheduler (despite being quite fair)
can forever preclude the system from ever reaching maximal segregation
(thus ”breaking the baseline stylized result”).
Proof. Wewill employ a fundamental property, noted for models of segre-
gation such as the one in this paper e.g. in [5]: they are potential games [26],
i.e., they admit a function L : S(G) → R such that, for any player i, any
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strategy profile (i.e., vector of player strategies) x−i := (xj)j∈V,j 6=i, and any
two strategies z, t for player i
ui(z; x−i)− ui(t; x−i) = L(z; x−i)− L(t; x−i). (4)
In other words, differences in utility of the i’th player as a result of
using different strategies are equal to the differences in potential among
the two corresponding profiles. The function L is defined simply as L(s) =∑
i ui(s). Strictly speaking the potential above is defined for the original
Policott-Weiss model i.e., defined on {±1}V , instead of S(G). But it can be
easily extended by simply applying it to any pair (s, e) (thus neglecting e).
Moreover, the following property holds, which determines the resistance
of moves:
Lemma 1. Let A ∈ {±1}V be a state of the system, and let e = (i, j) be a pair in
V ×V . Let B be a state obtained by making the movem = A→ B (B is either A
or is the state obtained from A by swapping the states Ai, Aj). Then the resistance
r(m) of movem is equal to:
r(m) = [ui(A) + uj(A)]− [ui(B) + uj(B)] = 2(L(A)− L(B)) > 0 (5)
when A→ B is a swap that diminishes potential, and to
[ui(C) + uj(C)]− [ui(A) + uj(A)] = 2(L(C)− L(A)) > 0 (6)
whenA = B, but the corresponding swapA→ C would be a potential improving
one. In all other cases r(m) = 0 (that ism is a neutral move).
In other words, a move has positive resistance when one of the fol-
lowing two alternatives hold: (a). The move corresponds to a decrease in
potential. The resistance of the move is, in this case, equal to the potential
decrease. (b). The move corresponds to preserving the current state (as
well as agents’ utilities), but the other possible move would have led to a
state of higher potential. The resistance of the move is, in this case, equal
to the difference in potentials between this better state and the current one.
Proof. Follows directly from equation (2) and the definition of resistance.
We apply this result to prove the following lemma:
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Figure 1: Decomposition of edges of tree T . Path p is on top.
Lemma 2. Consider a state Y ∈ Q that is maximally segregated. Consider
another state X , and a tree T rooted at X having minimal potential. Then there
exists another tree T rooted at Y whose potential is at most that of tree T , strictly
less in case when X is not a maximally segregated state.
Proof. Note that, by the definition of utility functions, maximally segre-
gated states are those that maximize the potential.
Since T is an oriented tree, there is an unique directed path
p : [Y = (s0, e0)→ . . .→ (sk, ek)→ (sk+1, ek+1)→ . . .→ (sr, er) = X ] (7)
in T from Y to X . Here s0, sr ∈ {±1}
V are states, and e0, er are pairs in
V × V . First, we decompose T into three subsets as follows:
1. The set of edges of p (see Figure 1)
2. The set of edges of,WY the subtree rooted at y.
3. The edges of subtrees Wk rooted at nodes (sk, ek) of p, other than Y
(but possibly including X).
Lemma 3. Without loss of generality we may assume that the path p contains no
two consecutive vertices (sk, ek) and (sr, er), k < r, with sk = . . . = sr and all
the moves between sk and sr having zero resistance.
Proof. Suppose there was such a pair k, r. Take one with maximal k − r.
Define a tree T ′ by
• First connecting (sk, ek) directly to (sr+1, er+1). This is legal since sk =
sr. Indeed, since activating edge er+1 move the system from sr to
sr+1, activating the same edge moves the system from (sk, ek) to sr+1
as well.
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• Also connecting (sk+1, ek+1), . . . , sr, er) directly to (sr+1, er+1)
It is easy to see that T ′ is a tree with the same resistance as T , since the only
removed edges have zero resistance.
In particular, applying iteratively Lemma 3, we may assume that all
transitions on the path from p to q either change the system state or have
positive resistance.
Now, to obtain tree T we will first obtain a graph T , in which every
node has at least one path to node Y . ”Thinning out” this directed graph to
a tree yields a tree T of even lower resistance. To obtain directed graph T :
1. First, add to T the edges of TY .
2. Next, define path q from X to Y as follows:
q : [(sr, er)→ (sr−1, er)→ (sr−2, er−1)→ . . .→ (s0, e1)→ (s0, e0)].
(8)
In other words, q aims to “undo” the sequence of moves in path
p from equation (7) from Y to X . However, since the states of the
Markov chain also have as a second component a pair in V ×V , (cor-
responding to the last scheduled edge), we need to take a little extra
care when defining q. Specifically q starts at X but cannot simply
reverse the edges of p, since these do not correspond to legal moves.
To define q, we first make a move at er by “undoing” the last move
of p 2. This yields state (Sr−1, er) (since pair er is scheduled in this
as well). We then continue to “undo moves of p” until the state be-
comes S0. This is possible because of condition (1): since pair er+1
can be scheduled after er, scheduling er can move the system from sr
to sr−1, scheduling pair er−1 can move the system from sr−1 to sr−2,
and so on, until state S0 is reached. At this moment the last activated
2this is where we use a property specific to our model of Schelling segregation, as op-
posed to proving a result valid for general potential game: the property that we employ
is that in Schelling’s model any move m ”can be undone”. This means that there is a
move n using the same pair of vertices as m that brings the system back to where it was
before. Move n simply ”swaps back” the two agents if they were swapped by m, and
leaves them in place otherwise.
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pair was e1. q then moves to Y by making a move (with no effect) on
e0.
Note that every such path will contain, for every k = 1, r, a vertex
whose state is sk.
3. For every tree component Wk obtained by removing path p from T ,
attached to p at (sk, ek) perform one of the following:
- Case 1: sk = sk−1.
In this case the point (sk, ek) = (sk−1, ek) is on path q as well,
therefore we also add the rooted tree Wk to T . This is possi-
ble since attaching a tree to a node depends only on the system
state, but not on the last scheduled node. Moreover, the resistance
ofWk does not change as a result of this attachment.
- Case 2: sk 6= sk−1 and move (sk−1, ek−1) → (sk, ek) has resistance
> 0.
In this case, since in configuration sk−1 and scheduled move ek
we have a choice between moving to sk and staying in sk−1,
it follows that the transition (sk−1, ek−1) → (sk−1, ek) has zero
resistance and L(sk) < L(sk−1). Hence transition (sk, ek) →
(sk−1, ek) has zero resistance.
We now add the tree Wk = Wk ∪ {(sk, ek) → (sk−1, ek)} (rooted
at node (sk−1, ek), which is on q) to T . The treeWk has the same
total resistance asWk. All nodes fromWk, including (sk, ek) can
now reach Y via q.
- Case 3: sk−1 6= sk, move (sk−1, ek−1) → (sk, ek) has zero resistance
and all moves on p between sk and X have zero resistance.
Then we add to T this portion of p, together withWk. This way
we connect nodes in Wk−1,Wk to Y (via X and q). All added
edges except those of one of the treesWl have zero resistance.
- Case 4: sk−1 6= sk, the move (sk−1, ek−1) → (sk, ek) has zero resis-
tance, but some move on p, between sk and X has positive resistance.
Let (sk+l, el) → (sk+l+1, el+1) be the closest move (i.e., the one
that minimizes l) with positive resistance.
If sk+l = sk+l+1 then we have already connected (sk+l, el) to Y ,
as it falls under Case 1. Now just add all the (zero resistance)
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edges of p between sk, ek and (sk+l, ek+l), together with edges of
Wk, to connect all such nodes to Y .
If sk+l = sk+l+1 then we have already connected (sk+l, el) to Y ,
as it falls under Case 2. We proceed similarly.
The previous construction has ensured that any pair (s, e) is connected
by at least one path to Y . Thinning out T we get a rooted tree T having
resistance less or equal to the resistance of T . Since the four outlined trans-
formations only add, in addition to trees Wk, edges of zero resistance, to
compare the total resistances of T and T one should simply compare the
total resistances of paths p and q. We claim that this difference in resis-
tances of these paths is equal to the difference in potentials:
Claim 1. r(p)− r(q) = 2(L(Y )− L(X)) ≥ 0.
Proving Claim (1) would validate our conclusion, since L(Y )−L(X) ≥
0, and L(X) = L(Y ) iff X is a global minimum state for the potential
function. We prove this by considering the correspondence between edges
of paths p and q: to each edge e of p one can associate an unique edge e′ of
Q that “undoes e”.
By the additivity of both resistance and potential, it is enough to prove
that, for every edge e of p and its associated edge of q, e′, r(e′)−r(e) is equal
to twice the difference in potentials between Sfin, the final state for the
forward transition and Sinit, the initial state. The first thing to note is none
of the two resistances can be infinite: the transition e → e′ corresponds
to a move of the perturbed Markov chain (optimal or not). Its inverse
corresponds to ”undoing” that move, which is a legal move (eventually
perturbed) in itself. We employ Lemma 1 and identify several cases:
• The move e corresponds to not switching, and its resistance is zero. Let
S1 be the common state, and let S2 be the state corresponding to a
switch. Then S1 = Sinit = Sfin. Also, L(S1) ≥ L(S2). So the move
e′ also stays in state S1 (when it could have gone to S2), which is the
optimal action, given that L(S1) ≥ L(S2). Thus in this case both the
”forward” and the ”backward” transition have resistance zero, and
do not count towards the sum of resistances on the path.
• The move e corresponds to switching, and its resistance is zero. Then,
Sfin = S2, Sinit = S1. By Lemma 1 L(S2) > L(S1). The backward
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move has positive resistance equal to 2(L(S2)− L(S1)). The result is
verified.
• The move e corresponds to not switching, and its resistance is nonzero.
Then Sinit = Sfin = S1 and L(S1) < L(S2) (since switching would be
beneficial). Therefore in the backward move the state stays S1 (when
it could have gone to S2). The resistance is equal to 2(L(S2)−L(S1)),
the same as the resistance of the forward move. Therefore r(e′) −
r(e) = L(Sfin)− L(Sinit) = 0.
• The move e corresponds to switching, and its resistance is nonzero. Then,
Sfin = S2, Sinit = S1, by Lemma 1 L(S2) < L(S1) and the resistance of
the forward move is equal to 2(L(S1)−L(S2)) = 2(L(Sinit)−L(Sfin)).
The resistance of the backward move is equal to zero, so the result is
verified in this case as well.
Thus the claim is established and the proof of the theorem is com-
plete.
5 Outlook and Further Work
Theorem 1 is only the main result in the adversarial analysis of Schelling’s
segregation model. It shows that stochastically segregated states are max-
imally segregated. Is the converse true ? Namely, is every maximally seg-
regated state stochastically stable ? Such a result is indeed true in 1D ver-
sions of Schelling’s segregation model (such as the one presented in [6]).
We will discuss the 2D case with Markovian contagion in the journal ver-
sion of the paper.
Other topics deserving research include studying conditions that pre-
clude segregation, determining the convergence time of the segregation
dynamics with Markovian contagion, models with Markovian contagion
and concurrent updates [8, 9], etc. We plan to address these and other
issues in follow-up papers.
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